Falling exports from China to Europe in 2025

In 2025, it became obvious that China’s exports to Europe slowed down. According to preliminary estimates, in the first three quarters of 2025, exports from China to the EU decreased by about 8-12 percent compared to the same period in 2024. This is one of the sharpest falls in nearly two decades.

Why it matters: A decline in exports from China could significantly alter the trade balance between China and Europe, affect supply chains, consumer prices, and send a strong signal to China’s economy – and to those countries that depend on Chinese imports, including Russia.

Statistics 2023–2025

Below is a conditional breakdown by the main categories of goods that experienced the greatest drop in imports to Europe:

This distribution shows that the decline in exports is not isolated: many commodity groups are falling at once, especially sensitive to tariffs, competition and changes in demand.

Why China’s exports to Europe are falling: key reasons

EU anti-dumping and countervailing duties

One of the main reasons for the decline is the tightening of trade regulations by the European Union. In 2024-2025, anti-dumping and countervailing duties were introduced or extended for a number of categories: electric cars from China, green technologies, metal products and electronics.

This dramatically increases the cost of Chinese goods when entering Europe, reduces competitiveness compared to European suppliers. As a result, many European companies have abandoned the previous volume of purchases, which directly affects the decline in exports.

China’s Overproduction Crisis

Inside China, oversupply is gradually accumulating: manufacturing capacity has been expanded to meet high global demand, but after the pandemic and economic turbulence, demand for consumer goods has declined.

Companies tried to offset weak domestic sales with exports by dumping the price. But the dumping has triggered higher tariffs and trade barriers from the EU, making exports less profitable. The crisis of overproduction thus transformed into a crisis of export flows.

Deglobalization and reorientation of supply chains (derisking)

European companies are increasingly reviewing their supply chains. The policy of “derisking” and the attempt to reduce dependence on China (including in strategically important industries) lead to the transfer of production to countries with lower political and trade risks, for example, in Eastern Europe, Turkey, India, Vietnam.

This means that imports from China are gradually being replaced by local production or supplies from alternative countries. The European market is reducing the share of Chinese exports, which strengthens the downward trend.

Declining purchasing power and changing demand in Europe

Post-war inflation, rising interest rates, economic instability in the EU countries all reduce the purchasing power of the population. People buy less: the demand for inexpensive electronics, clothing, household goods is reduced. As a result, Chinese suppliers are losing a key consumer segment.

In addition, European consumers are increasingly focused on sustainability, green technologies and local products, which reduces the attractiveness of cheap mass Chinese goods.

Increased competition from other countries

With increasing trade barriers and risks, many European companies have switched to suppliers from Southeast Asia, Turkey, and the Middle East. Production costs remain low and logistics chains are shorter than those of China.

Thus, Chinese exports to Europe are losing market share due to competitive alternatives, which strengthens the downward trend.

Commodity groups that suffered the most

• Electric cars and auto components. Due to the introduction of duties, rising logistics costs and localization of production in the EU, the demand for Chinese electric cars fell sharply. Manufacturers and retailers are adjusting portfolios: China’s BEVs are losing appeal.
• Solar panels, green technologies. The EU is actively encouraging local production of green products, reducing imports from countries suspected of dumping – making Chinese panels less competitive.
• Smartphones and consumer electronics. Falling consumer demand, preference for European or local brands, increased logistics costs – all this contributes to a decrease in supplies.
• Clothing, shoes, textiles. In the past, European brands have actively ordered cheap textiles from China – now, with tariffs, delays and competitive offers from Asia, Eastern Europe and Turkey, the flow of fabrics and clothing from China has declined significantly.
• Metal and metal products. Under pressure from tariffs, environmental regulations and European production, Chinese steel and rolled steel are losing ground as export material.

In general, China’s exports to Europe are no longer a “duty option” for many industries; previously stable supply chains are now under review, and exports are in a state of constant decline.

Implications for China

• Hitting employment in export provinces. EU-focused factories are cutting output, which could lead to layoffs and social tensions, especially in regions like Guangdong and Zhejiang.
• Increased inventory and falling profitability. The decline in export orders means that goods remain in warehouses, companies incur additional costs, margins fall.
• Pressure on currency and economy. Declining export revenues could weaken the yuan, increase the burden on the domestic market; Chinese companies will begin to look for new markets – Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Russia.
• Refocus on domestic demand and other markets. In the face of falling European demand, China will boost domestic consumption and seek partners outside Europe, leading to a shift in export geography.

Implications for Europe

• Rising prices for some goods in the short term. With some of China’s cheap supplies gone, consumers may face a rise in the price of electronics, clothing, and “mass” goods, especially if European manufacturers fail to ramp up output immediately.
• Accelerated localization of production and investment in “their” plants. European companies, wanting to secure supply chains, will invest in the creation of production in the EU or in friendly countries. This could be an incentive for technological and industrial development within Europe.
• Reduced dependence on foreign markets, a green transition without Chinese dependence. By reducing imports from China, Europe has the chance to build a more sustainable and greener market – with less geopolitical and trade risks.

Forecast for 2026-2027

1. Stabilization at a new level. Most likely, exports from China to Europe will not return to pre-crisis levels. After a sharp fall, a stabilization phase is possible – at the level of 15-25% below the indicators of 2023. This will be the “new normal.”
2. Partial redistribution of supply chains. Some Chinese companies, especially manufacturers of “green” equipment and electronics, will try to adapt, reduce costs or revise markets.
3. Possible attempts by the EU to ease tariffs. Some of the tariffs may be renegotiated in trade agreements, especially if China offers environmental or localization benefits. This could theoretically boost exports, but is highly dependent on political volatility.
4. Increasing competition of alternative countries: Vietnam, India, Turkey, etc. These countries will continue to “take” a share of Chinese exports, and even if China tries to return, competition will be very high.

Exports from China to Europe are falling not because of one reason, but because of a set of factors – trade, economic, structural and geopolitical. This is a systemic shift that requires rethinking supply chains, supplier strategies, and finding new markets.